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Introduction
On July 1, 2011 Germany formally suspended the military draft, 
marking the end of a postwar tradition. West Germany introduced 
compulsory military service in 1957 as a way to ensure its postwar 
military is subservient to a democratic Parliament, by binding its armed 
forces to society. Over the decades and through the reunification of East 
and West Germany, conscripts served in either the Bundeswehr, as the 
armed forces are called, or in alternative civil service, for example as 
helpers in old-age homes, for periods that varied from a maximum of 
18 months, and, toward the end, of only six months. Despite being such 
a major reform, little research exists examining the impact of Germany’s 
military draft suspension. This article fills this gap by estimating the 
effects of Germany’s switch to an All-Volunteer Force (AVF) on the 
composition and quality of recruits into the German Armed Forces 
(GAF), as well as on the overall perception of the importance of 
national security among the German population. To do so, the authors 
employ German micro census data, German General Social Surveys, 
and a difference-in-differences empirical framework. The difference-
in-differences strategy mimics an experimental research design, and in 
this context, compares the difference in outcomes among German men 
who were subject to the draft relative to those who were not, during the 
years before versus after the draft suspension. The data and analyses 
reveal that the educational qualifications of recruits into the German 
military dramatically increased under the volunteer system relative 
to the draft. In the two years post-draft, the odds of a recruit having 
a higher secondary degree more than doubled among 17-19-year-old 
males in service compared to the control group. This indicates a striking 
improvement in the quality of German military manpower. In addition, 
the overall perception of the importance of national security among 
the German population dropped, which in turn suggests a decline in 
demand for defense. This finding begs the question of whether the 
German voluntary system will be sustainable in light of its population 
declines. 
 The rest of this article is organized as follows. The next section 
provides a brief review of related literature and discusses German’s 
military draft suspension. Section 3 describes the data sources and 
empirical methods, while Section 4 presents the findings. The last 
section concludes and considers the policy implications of these 
findings.
Brief Review of Related Literature
The suspension of Germany’s conscription policy occurred decades 
after its major allies took the same steps, including the United States 
that ended the draft in 1973. Many of the arguments on a military 
draft vs. a volunteer system were articulated in the USA context, and 
the debates were particularly contentious in light of the Vietnam War 
escalation in the mid-1960s. In 1969 USA President Nixon established 
the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Force whose Report 
paved the way for the abolition of the draft in 1973. 
The Report presented and addressed nine arguments against 
an AVF. Specifically, an AVF would: (1) be too costly, (2) crowd out 
other defense spending, (3) be less effective because only low-ability 
personnel would sign up, (4) be too inflexible in times of a crisis, 
(5) undermine patriotism by lessening the belief that each citizen
has a moral responsibility to serve the country, (6) become an elitist
institution, (7) be a mercenary force, (8) be racially unrepresentative,
and (9) encourage foreign military adventurism [1].
The nine arguments can be summarized into a focus on the 
consequences of either manning policy for costs and efficiency, military 
effectiveness and manpower quality, and social justice ideals. 
Most economists, including Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman and 
Walter Oi [2], argued that the real cost of manning the armed forces 
via conscription is greater than the cost of manning a volunteer force 
of the same size. Despite its potentially lower budgetary cost, a draft 
actually imposes larger overall costs because of the opportunity costs 
of draftees who are working at wages below what they would have 
otherwise earned in the labor market. Differences in comparative 
advantages of military conscripts are inefficiently harnessed in a draft 
system, generating additional social losses. 
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Lee and McKenzie [3] lay out a theoretical framework for thinking 
about the draft vs. AVF that illustrate manning the military with 
volunteers is not unambiguously superior to a draft in terms of social 
cost. If military objectives are such that they require a force size above 
some theoretical threshold, then a draft force is more cost-efficient. 
Also, a volunteer force can actually be more socially costly if the AVF’s 
budgetary costs are financed through highly distortionary taxes vs. 
in-kind under a draft [4]. The question of whether an AVF or draft is 
costlier is ultimately empirical in nature and hinges on the elasticity of 
manpower supply and productivity differences between volunteers and 
conscripts. 
Keller et al. [5] shows that conscription has a statistically significant 
negative impact on economic performance among OECD countries, 
indicating its social cost. They note that in addition to the above 
arguments, shorter periods of training, lack of experience, and greater 
turnover in a draft system imply lower labor productivity among 
conscripts than among professional soldiers. In addition, volunteers 
are likely to be more motivated than draftees. On the other hand, the 
volunteer system does generate selection problems since the marginal 
recruit will be one with the lowest opportunity costs. Thus, an AVF 
will be more efficient in terms of military manpower quality only if the 
selection of draftee quality is worse than among volunteers. 
Indeed, the USA experience of switching from the draft to an 
AVF has shown that the average quality of military service-members 
improved, attracting a greater proportion of recruits with high school 
diplomas and/or with cognitive ability (AFQT) scores at or above the 
median of its youth population (CBO) [6]. Turnover has also declined 
since 1973, while the average experience levels of its military personnel 
increased, indicating improvements in USA military productivity [4]. 
Concerns remain about the representativeness of the military force: 
today’s recruits come primarily from families in the middle or lower 
middle classes, while the high end of the socioeconomic distribution is 
not well represented. African Americans are slightly overrepresented as 
Hispanics and women are underrepresented, compared to the civilian 
population. The other fears of an AVF noted by Gates et al. [1], such as 
military elitism and that it would turn into a mercenary force, do not 
seem to have materialized [7]. 
Rostker [8] identifies four broad reasons for the success of the AVF 
concept in the USA: (1) attention and leadership from top management, 
including the Gates Commission to senior government officials who 
oversaw recruitment; (2) use of quantitative analysis to test, adjust, and 
evaluate AVF policies; (3) programs for attracting the necessary type 
and number of recruits; and (4) adequate financial resources. To attract 
high-quality youths to enlist, the USA military learned it had to offer 
programs such as money for education, bonuses to enlist in certain 
occupations, enlistment tours of different lengths, and opportunities to 
develop careers that had civilian relevance. The USA defense budget had 
to be large enough to not only offer these incentives, but also support 
pay raises that kept up with inflation and with civilian pay increases, as 
well as resources for recruiting and quality-of-life initiatives [9]. 
Meanwhile, by 2010 most of the major NATO players and Western 
Europe had switched to voluntary service [10]. The end of the Cold 
War reduced the need for massive armies, while new mission designs 
(peace-keeping, monitoring, counter-insurgency) called for fewer, 
more sophisticated, yet highly specialized soldiers. Germany itself was 
experiencing a decline in its demand for military manpower. Figure 
1 illustrates this declining trend in the number of men performing 
military service in Germany even prior to the draft suspension [11].
Germany had conscription for its male citizens aged 17-19 from 
1957 to 2011. Women were not subject to conscription, and families 
who were oppressed by the Nazi regime were also exempt. They could 
join the military as volunteers, however. In November 2010, Germany’s 
then-Defense Minister Karl-Theodor Freiherr zu Guttenberg proposed 
to the government to suspend conscription as of July 1, 2011. An 
outright abolition of the draft would require a constitutional reform, 
so technically the German constitution still has provisions that would 
legalize the potential reintroduction of conscription. 
Note. Adapted from Germany, German Bundestag. (2016). Unterrichtung durch den Wehrbeauftragten Jahresbericht 2015 (57. Bericht) (pp. 89-90). Berlin, 
Germany: Deutscher Bundestag. Drucksache 18/7250
Figure 1: Military manpower of the German armed forces.
Citation: Bacolod M, Koenigsmark S (2017) When Germany Ended Conscription, and an Era: Effects on Composition and Quality of its Military. J Def Manag 
7: 165. doi:10.4172/2167-0374.1000165
Page 3 of 6
Volume 7 • Issue 2 • 1000165J Def Manag, an open access journal
ISSN: 2167-0374
The German Defense Minister argued that the switch to an AVF 
would enable Germany to build a more cost-effective professional GAF 
suited for modern defense needs such as NATO and UN operations. 
Conscripts could not deploy to such active service missions, and the 
German contribution to forces such as ISAF in Afghanistan or KFOR 
in Kosovo were comprised exclusively of professional soldiers and 
volunteers. On the eve of the draft’s suspension, only about 5,000 
German soldiers were part of the NATO-led campaign in Afghanistan1. 
Dr. Guttenberg announced that along with suspending conscription, 
the Defense ministry would also restructure and downsize the force by 
65,000, claiming that would allow Germany to save $10 billion2. 
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there are no studies to date 
that have examined the consequences of Germany’s switch to a volunteer 
system on manpower quality and perceptions of national security, 
and only a few empirical studies that estimated efficiency losses of its 
previous draft system. For instance, Lutz [12] estimates that the annual 
monetized utility losses of conscripts in the German army were between 
€2.2 and 6.7 billion (between 9 and 27% of German defense expenditure 
at that time). Kunze [13] also finds that for German conscripts, their 
wages increase by 3.2% in the first year after compulsory service, but 
their wage income declines thereafter and the gap in wages between 
draftees and non-draftees only increases with time.
Data and Methods
Data
Data for analysis come from two separate sources. To analyze 
outcomes related to the composition and quality of recruits into GAF, 
the authors turn to German micro census annual surveys from 2010 
to 2013. The German General Social Surveys (GGSS) from 2008 to 
2014 are employed to analyze changes in the German population’s 
perceptions of national security. 
The German micro censuses are annual representative one-percent 
cross-section samples of the German population (German Federal 
Office of Statistics 2013)3. Data for analysis include two years before 
and two years after the end of conscription, allowing for a comparative 
analysis. The analysis sample includes all Germans aged 17 to 65 years 
old who are actively participating in the workforce. 
From this data, an individual is identified as a military recruit if 
the respondent’s occupation at any point in the last year is “military 
service member” (n=501). Highest degree of education completed 
is used to capture a recruit’s quality, classified as three categories: 
midschool (middle school or equivalent only), high school (high school 
or equivalent) and sec school (highest secondary degree that qualifies 
for further education at a university). Roughly, these German degrees 
translate in the USA education system to completion of 9th grade (mid 
school), 12th grade vocational school (high school), and the equivalent 
of a USA high school degree is the German “Abitur” (sec school). The 
authors also examine whether or not a military recruit was unemployed 
in the last 12 months, as this could indicate enlistee quality4 (Table 1).
1http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/world/europe/01germany.html 
2http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/28/world/europe/28germany.html
3Due to privacy restrictions, the federal office of statistics limit scientific use files 
to a random 70% subsample from this. Furthermore, access to the data is limited 
to remote access. The authors send the STATA do-files of statistical commands 
to the federal office, they execute the commands and then screen the output for 
personally identifiable information before releasing the results.
4Koenigsmark, Stefan (2016). Suspended draft: Effects on the Composition and 
Quality of the Military Workforce in the German Armed Forces. NPS Master’s 
Thesis, Monterey, CA.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the key variables from this 
data, averaged over non-missing responses for each variable. All statistics 
use weights so the numbers are nationally representative. Means are 
presented separately for military recruits and the German population as 
a whole. Not surprisingly, there are fewer females in the military recruit 
sample (5.3%) compared to the general population (49.6%). Recruits 
are also on average younger than the overall population (22.7 vs. 41.4). 
Note that the distribution of education qualifications is such that fewer 
among military recruits are at lower education levels (midschool) and 
more at highschool compared to the overall German population. These 
differences are discussed in the context of results from a multivariate 
regression framework below. 
Meanwhile the German General Social Survey (GGSS) is also 
nationally representative and has been conducted by the society of social-
scientific infrastructure facilities (Gesellschaft Sozialwissenschaftlicher 
Infrastruktureinrichtungen - GESIS) every two years since 1980. The 
focus of the GGSS is on the perceptions and attitudes of the German 
population. The authors use GGSS data from two waves before the end 
of conscription (2008, 2010) and two years after (2012, 2014). 
Perceptions of the importance of national security in the GGSS 
come from a question on how important are public order and security 
of Germany to the respondent. Respondents can respond on a four-
point scale from “most important” (1) to “least important” (4). Table 
2 presents summary statistics of the data used for analysis, which 
shows the perceived importance of national security is 2.34 between 
2008-2014. The GGSS sample size has been about 3500 for every GGSS 
survey since 1992, and approximately 1.4% of the analysis sample is in 
the age range that is subject to a military draft (Table 2).
Methods
The end of German conscription is effectively a natural experiment 
Variables Recruits Population
Sample size 501 1,739,344
Age 22.7 (5.6) 41.4 (13.3)
Female 5.3% 49.6%
Middle school degree 21.3% 28.6%
High school degree 45.4% 32.4%
Secondary school degree 31.5% 32.6%
Unemployed 12mo ago 5.0% 4.0%
Unemployment rate in state 7.8% (2.7) 7.1% (2.6)
Treatment group (17-19yo male, C=1) 18.2% 2.5%
Post draft (T=1) 72.5% 67.0%
Note: Data are from the German Micro Census Data from 2010 to 2013. Standard 
errors are in brackets where applicable.




Employed in Public Service 11.80%
Income per Year in Euro 24,661 (40,906)
Importance of Free Speech 2.56 (1.08)
Importance of Public Security 2.34 (1.08)
Treatment Group (17-19yo male, C=1) 1.4%
Respondents after the Policy Change 52.7%
Female 50.2%
Note: Data are from the German General Social Surveys from 2008 to 2014. 
Standard errors are in brackets where applicable.
Table 2: Summary statistics in the GGSS.
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since the policy directly affects only a certain part of the population: 
male teenagers between 17 and 19 years who could be drafted. As a 
consequence, the rest of the German population can serve as a “control 
group” in the experiment. The control group captures conditions in the 
labor market and overall economy experienced by Germans who were 
and weren’t subject to the draft—that is, conditions common to both 
treatment or experimental and control groups—in the years before and 
years after the draft suspension. 
More specifically, the equation the authors estimate is given by 
0 1 2 3 ( )β β β β ε= + + + × + +it it itY T C T C BX                                 (1) 
where Yit represent the measures of outcomes discussed above such as 
number of recruits, education levels and unemployment of military 
recruits, and perceptions of the importance of national defense; T=1 
for all time periods t after July 1, 2011; C=1 if person i is male and 
aged 17-19 at year t, that is, subject to the draft. Xit controls for other 
confounding factors that might influence Yit. For outcomes using the 
German micro census, Xit include the unemployment rate in the state 
the respondent resides in, respondent’s age and gender, survey year, etc. 
In the regressions using GGSS, Xit include age, gender, income, survey 
year, and whether i is employed in the public sector. 
The parameter of interest is β3, which is the average value of the 
change in Y after the draft suspension relative to before, among the 
German population subject to the draft compared to the population 
that was not. It is thus the difference in the difference (DiD) estimate of 
the effect of the end of conscription on various outcomes.
Results and Discussion
Table 3 reports the estimates of the effect of Germany’s draft 
suspension on enlistment rates. The first column reports the β3 or DiD 
estimates and coefficient estimates of the other regressors for the entire 
population, while the second column further restricts the analysis 
sample to ages 17-25. The data indicate the draft suspension caused 
an 8.33% decline in enlistment rates (or 0.002 decline in probability 
to enlist in column 1) among 17-19-year-old males compared to the 
control group. This significant decline in enlistment rates after the end 
of conscription is what we would expect given German manpower 
policy at the time and the Literature reviewed above Table 3.
Also, as expected, the treatment group of 17-19-year-old males 
are on average significantly more likely to enlist than the rest of the 
population, and even relative to young adults aged 20-25 (column 2 
restricting the sample to young adults aged 17-25). Interestingly, the 
probability to enlist (again holding everything else constant) among 
the group targeted by the draft does not change significantly in the 
period before versus after Germany suspended conscription (column 
2, coefficient on Post Draft). 
Table 3 further shows some interesting patterns. Among young 
adults, all three categories of educational attainment significantly predict 
enlistment during 2010-2013. The local area’s prevailing unemployment 
rates also significantly predict enlistment in the expected direction, as 
does one’s lack of employment in the last 12 months. These patterns are 
consistent with prior literature in that in areas where unemployment is 
high, relatively more of its citizens choose to enter the military. 
Turning now to the estimates on the effect of draft suspension on 
manpower quality, Table 4 reports results from a multinomial logit 
estimation of the probability of each education level among GAF 
recruits before versus after the end of conscription. Compared to 
enlisting with just a high school degree, the odds of a recruit having the 
higher secondary degree increased dramatically, by 2.17 times or 117% 
higher, in the post-draft era among 17-19-year-old males compared to 
the control group. The estimate shows the draft suspension caused GAF 
manpower quality, as measured by education qualifications, to more 
than double (Table 4).
Combined with the result of an overall decline in enlistment 
rates and the total force decline in Figure 1 during this period, these 
estimates indicate significant improvements in the quality of recruits 
into the GAF with the end of conscription. These results are consistent 
with the findings reviewed in Section II above, where the AVF changed 
USA military quality for the better (Figure 2).
Finally, Figure 2 illustrates the DiD estimates of the effect of draft 
suspension on perceived military importance that are also confirmed by 
the estimates in Table 5. These estimates show the decline in perceived 
importance of national security among the German population overall 
and especially among the population subject to a draft. This could 
indicate a steeper decline in demand for defense among the population 
previously subject to a draft, relative to the overall German population. 
This in turn suggests that those volunteering to enlist are particularly 
more motivated, since they are selecting or choosing to enlist even as 
the average German citizen has a lower demand for defense. 
Concluding Remarks
On July 1, 2011 Germany formally suspended the draft that had 
been in place since 1957, ending an era of its citizens in uniform. To 




Post Draft (T) 0.0001*** (0.0000) -0.0001 (0.0003)
Treatment (17-19yo male, C) 0.0011 *** (0.0003) 0.0028 *** (0.0004)
DiD (T × C) -0.0024** (0.0010) -0.0017** (0.0011)
Middle school degree -0.0003*** (0.0000) 0.0029*** (0.0003)
High school degree 0.0003*** (0.0000) 0.0032*** (0.0003)
Secondary school degree 0.0001*** (0.0000) 0.0024*** (0.0002)
Unemployment rate -0.0000*** (0.0000) -0.0000*** (0.0000)
Unemployed 12 months ago 0.0001*** (0.0001) 0.0003*** (0.0000)
Female -0.0005*** (0.0000) -0.0042*** (0.0003)
Age 0.0000*** (0.0000) -0.0005*** (0.0000)
R-squared 0.0012 0.0026
Observations 1,739,344 243,071
Note: Data are from the German Micro Census 2010-2013. Robust standard 
errors are in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Column (1) includes the 
population aged 17-65 years old, (2) includes the population 17-25 years old.
Table 3: Probability to enlist in German armed forces.
Variables Coefficient Relative Risk
Secondary School
Post Draft (T) 0.0067 (0.06389) 1.0067 (0.0635)
Treatment (17-19yo male, C) 0.3913** (0.1977) 1.4789** (0.2924)
DiD (T × C) 0.7754** (0.3896) 2.1715** (0.1794)
High School base outcome
Middle School
Post Draft (T) 0.0751 (0.0823) 0.9277 (0.0764)
Treatment (17-19 yo male, C) 0.2344 (0.2480) 0.7910 (0.3135)
DiD (T × C) 0.0615 (0.4444) 0.9404 (0.4179)
Observations 5530
Note: Data are from the German Micro Census 2010-2013. Robust 
standard errors are in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 4: Education of recruits in GAF: Multinomial logit estimates.
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draft suspension. This article fills this gap by employing data from 
the German Micro Census and the German General Social Surveys 
to estimate the causal effects of the switch to an All-Volunteer Force 
on the quantity and quality of German military recruits, as well as 
perceived demand for defense. Using a difference-in-differences 
empirical strategy, the authors find that while the perceived importance 
of national defense dropped, the average quality of military recruits 
significantly increased with the switch to AVF. 
While the results of improved quality of German military recruits 
under the volunteer system is positive, Germany is also faced with 
unique challenges moving forward. With its decline in fertility and 
birth rates, there are fewer German youth to recruit from than in 
decades past. Analysis in this paper shows a decline in perception of 
the importance of defense. In addition, the Bundeswehr now competes 
with universities and apprenticeships for its military recruits. 
As the Literature Review noted, a key reason the AVF was 
successful in the USA context was its focus on attracting quality recruits 
by expanding the benefits and opportunities of military service [8]. 
The compensation and programs required to entice recruits into the 
GAF—and have the most capable members re-enlist—will thus have 
to develop to keep attracting the right type and number of recruits 
in light of the population decline. Over time manpower planners can 
obtain analytical evidence to refine the set of programs, incentives, 
and benefits that encourage German enlistment that meets its security 
needs and functions. 
Finally, by its empirical design this study covered only two years 
before and after the draft suspension. Given the changes in the German 
labor market and overall economy since then, it would be useful to 
further examine the dynamics in the quality of German military 
recruits. 
Disclaimer
The views expressed in this paper are the authors’ own and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the USA Department of Defense or the German Navy. 
All errors are also our own.
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